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David was born in Mexico but brought to the United States when he was six
months old and lived his entire life here believing he was a United States citizen. His
parents were lawful permanent residents since before David was born, but through
misinformation had failed to obtain proper papers for their son. Not until David was in
his mid-twenties attempting to petition his new wife for residency at the American
embassy in Mexico did he discover the truth. Not only was he not a citizen of his home
country, he was now permanently banned from returning to the U.S. as a consequence
for falsely claiming citizenship. Despite his sincere belief in his legal status in the U.S.,
David was permanently barred for his parents’ error.
Carlos was five years old when he was permanently barred from residency status
in the United States. Having overstayed a tourist visa as a toddler, Carlos’ lawful
permanent resident parents took an emergency visit to Mexico to visit his dying
grandmother. Despite having “waited in line” for over 5 years to gain residency through
his family reunification petition, Carlos was not only ultimately denied but permanently
barred from residency. Carlos would not be eligible for discretionary relief until he
completed the first ten years of his bar outside the United States. 1
The above composite cases represent clients that I see on a daily basis through the
course of my work as a BIA Accredited Representative with Catholic Charities Chicago. As a
non-profit legal practitioner in a leading immigrant community, I encounter a significant volume
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The “David Case” and “Carlos Case” presented are composite cases loosely based on real life cases seen in the
course of my practice as a Board of Immigration Appeals Accredited Representative at Catholic Charities in
Chicago, IL. See pages 33-42 for an in-depth presentation and analysis of the composite cases.
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and variety of cases. My specialty is family reunification law, 2 and as an advocate the cases
which cause the most angst frequently involve children. The “David case” and “Carlos case” are
examples of such cases and depict proper outcomes under the law as it is written and applied
as of March 2011.
U.S. immigration law has become a complex web of social, political, and legal realities
which impacts both immigrant families and the nation as a whole. The voices in the polarizing
debate today vary greatly. Some bemoan the anti-immigrant attitude calling it “racism” or
“classism,” adding that the nation lacks respect for immigrants who “do the jobs Americans
aren’t willing to do.” 3 Others cry foul when they see “floods of illegal aliens invading our land”
that lack respect for the “rule of law” and surreptitiously enter the U.S. by not “waiting in
line.” 4
The Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRAIRA) was one
attempt to limit the “floods” of illegal aliens and tighten restrictions on undocumented
immigrants already present in the U.S. In reviewing IIRAIRA and its effects, scholars have
largely focused on the changes to the removal system and questions of due process.5 Less
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Family reunification is the dominant avenue through which U.S. legal status is authorized, and involves a lawful
permanent resident or citizen of the U.S. requesting legal status for a qualifying family member.
3
Daniel Gross, “Dirty Work: What Are the Jobs Americans Won’t Do?” posted January 12, 2007,
http://www.slate.com/id/21574831 (accessed March 12, 2011).
4
Pablo Manriquez, “There is No Line for most Unauthorized Immigrants to Legally Come to the U.S., But There
Could Be” posted September 14, 2010 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/pablo-manriquez/there-is-no-line-formost_b_713948.html (accessed March 12, 2011).
5
Michelle Magnus, “The Expanding Definition of Aggravated Felonies and the Retroactive Effect of Recent Reforms
on Lawful Permanent Residents: An Analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA),”
Immigration and Nationality Law Review, 22 (2001): 717-731.
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work has been done to assess the effects of IIRAIRA on administrative applicants for
immigration benefits.
The treatment of children as a distinct population under various areas of United States
law has been reviewed and debated since the 1890s. 6 Many legal frameworks for justifying
treating children as a distinct population consider minors’ lack of agency and therefore lack of
culpability in violations of law. 7 Scholars have long noted the gap between special safeguards
which exist for children in family law, labor law, and welfare law; compared to those under
immigration law available to immigrant and citizen children.8 This is particularly true
surrounding the role of the notion of “best interest of the child” both in the writing and
implementation of the law. 9
The immigration debate is largely divisive, even as our national commitment to
protecting children is unifying. Perhaps if advocates for reform on either side of the debate
began with reform for children, concessions could be made leading to more coherent and
comprehensive policies for our nation. Some academics and practitioners have noted the irony
of the abundance of state and federal policies which integrate undocumented children into
society even as children are legally marginalized by immigration law. 10 The importance of
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Melissa Klapper, Small Strangers, (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2007), 145-146.
David B. Thronson, “Entering the Mainstream: Making Children Matter in Immigration Law,” Fordham Urban Law
Journal 39 (November 2010): 393-413.
8
Thronson, “Entering the Mainstream,” 393-413.
9
Brigette Carr, “Incorporating a ‘Best Interests of the Child’ Approach into Immigration Law and Procedure,” Yale
Human Rights & Development 12 (2009): 120-159.
10
Ragini Shah, “Sharing the American Dream: Towards Formalizing the Status of Long-Term Resident
Undocumented Children in the United States,” Columbia Human Rights Law Review 39 (Summer 2008): 637-679.
7
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family unity in the lives of children has been thoroughly explored 11 as well as the very limited
recognition of family as “nuclear” unit under family reunification law. 12 As policy memoranda
have been published highlighting and defining the various components of IIRAIRA, little has
been done to ensure that its impact on children is purposeful and efficacious.
This thesis seeks to evaluate U.S. immigration law and policy in light of their observable
impact on children. My purpose is to review and assess the efficacy of current family
reunification law specifically as regards minors: its clarity or ambiguity, consistency in
application, and its effects on respect for the rule of law and just consequences. Section one
addresses normative dimensions of justice including the legal notion that a punishment meted
out should be proportionate to the crime of the perpetrator, the idea of consistency as a
necessary though insufficient aspect of justice, and the importance of understanding the
complexities of the casually used notion of the “rule of law.” 13 Section two considers the legal
and social precedents for special consideration of minors through a historical review comparing
the development of immigration law and the concept of “childhood.” Section three details
specific failures under immigration law for children with a special focus on IIRAIRA’s additional
grounds of inadmissibility. My goal is to expose the consequences such laws have on minors as
well as the ways significant inconsistencies undermine the immigrant, adjudicator, and nation’s
respect for the law. My analysis will conclude with recommendations for reform in light of the

11

Monique Hawthorne, “Family Unity in Immigration Law: Broadening the Scope of ‘Family’,” Lewis & Clark Law
Review 11 no. 3, (September 2007): 809-833.
12
Hawthorne, “Family Unity in Immigration Law,” 809-833.
13
The “rule of law” is a phrase frequently used rhetorically by the media and academia alike to suggest that when
immigration laws are broken there is a break-down of respect for the law. This paper explores several different
approaches to understanding how immigration laws may govern.
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plenary power doctrine and the notion that minors without legal status may not expect
protection under our laws.
The heart of this paper will be an analysis of the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), a draconian law passed in 1996 which continues to have far
reaching consequences for children; those both lawfully and unlawfully present.14 Academics
and advocates have written a great deal on the harsh nature of IIRAIRA and its consequences,
but the vast majority of scholarly work to date focuses on the treatment of criminal aliens and
their family members as a result of changes in the removal system. 15 The impact of changes in
administrative adjudications has been largely overlooked. In particular, administrative effects
on minor children have been all but ignored. Due consideration for non-criminal aliens under
IIRAIRA must recognize the often irreversible consequences for minors with little autonomy and
even less responsibility for violations of civil immigration law.
Failing to consider the impact of law and policy on the most innocent and vulnerable
populations among us is detrimental to the rule of law and the preservation of an orderly and
just society. Children are one of the clearest examples of an innocent and vulnerable
population harmed by the lack of coherency and consistency in our immigration laws. The
sheer volume of children present in the U.S. directly impacted by our immigration laws
supports this premise. According to an August 2010 Pew Hispanic Center study, twenty-four
percent of all children under the age of eighteen were immigrants themselves or offspring of
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Pub. L. 104-208.
Magnus, “The Expanding Definition of Aggravated Felonies and the Retroactive Effect of Recent Reforms on
Lawful Permanent Residents,” 717-731.
15
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foreign born parents. 16 Indeed, children who are part of immigrant-led families comprise “the
fastest growing segment of the (United States) population.” 17
Considerations for Realizing Justice for Minors under Immigration Law
As Carlos’ and David’s stories evidence, current immigration law is convoluted and
inconsistent, leading to significant consequences for minor children and their families.
Immigration law is years behind the development of other areas of law impacting children,
often justified by the “legality” of the child in question. Particularly in the area of family
reunification, immigration laws directly affecting children rarely consider the agency of the
child. Ironically, children are held culpable 18 for breaking immigration laws yet are excluded
from reaping the benefits many adults may enjoy. 19
Even in affirmative proceedings (those involving the adjudication of benefits as
opposed to defense from removal) minors’ interests are silent at best, actively thwarted at
worst. No place is this more evident in the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) then under
IIRAIRA. Here, it is instead clear that perceived national security and economic interests (laced
with overt and discrete racial discourse) by and large have dictated immigration law in the
United States. In amending the law, Congress is heavily influenced by constantly changing
policies. A clear understanding of the law as written, its application, and its measurable

16

Jeffrey Passel, “Unauthorized Immigrants and Their U.S.-Born Children” Pew Hispanic Center posted August 11,
2010 http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?report10=125 (accessed May 7, 2011).
17
David Thronson, “Kids Will Be Kids?: Reconsidering Conceptions of Children’s Rights Underlying Immigration
Law,” Ohio State Law Journal 63 no. 979, (2002): 1.
18
Culpability under the law usually considers the agency of the individual; that is the individual’s responsibility for
making moral decisions. This concept enters the legal arena of mens rea, meaning “guilty mind” and is outside the
scope of this thesis.
19
Specific examples of administrative immigration benefits are discussed; see page 14.
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effectiveness is often lacking. In part this is due to the complexity of economic, social, and
political factors directly impacted by immigration law. The discursive nature of immigration
further complicates matters as opposing opinions frequently rely more on rhetoric than fact. 20
As minors dependent on their parents, guardians, or the state, thousands of children
each year face life-altering consequences due to the implementation of immigration law.
Regardless of their motivations to immigrate (most often family reunification, physical safety,
or a search for viable economic opportunities) the lack of legal options and safeguards for
minors under immigration law is startling. It has been remarked that it is tough to reach a
consensus on how to treat immigrants who are here lawfully, even more so the treatment of
those who are unlawfully present.21 I would argue that an inverted notion could be framed
around children. Determining how to respond to minors who are here undocumented must be
less complex than responding to their parents. The debate regarding immigration law and
particularly undocumented migration consists of a cacophony of voices wherein those with
differing positions have difficulty listening to one another much less coming to a consensus. As
we attempt to inform ourselves of the relevant issues and gain a decent understanding of
existing immigration law, perhaps a wise place to begin would be to look at the law as it affects
minors.
There is a pervasive assumption that the law is a positivistic body of language,
positivistic in that its objectivity is both inherent and obvious in its nature. Facts exist and are
20

Discourse theory is used throughout this paper in the Michael Foucault sense, referring to the power dynamics
of language which limit ways of knowing and thinking. Discourse theory as it relates to immigration is discussed
beginning on page 15.
21
Hiroshi Motomura, “We Asked for Workers, but Families Came: Time, Law and the Family in Immigration and
Citizenship,” Virginia Journal of Social Policy & the Law 15, no. 2 (2008): 103-118.
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adjudicated under a predetermined rubric of knowable statutes and regulations. Such
simplification of the complex web of governing immigration laws and their often incoherent
interaction hides their political nature. The modern day discourse of America as a land
governed by the “rule of law” is rendered meaningless if the governing laws are too complex
and incoherent for consistent interpretation and application. In other words, if statutes and
their implementing regulations are not sufficiently coherent to enable officials to apply them
consistently or to allow immigrants to know what is expected of them, perhaps they are less
accessible and knowable than common sense would suggest. To be sure, written consistency
between laws and their practical application to real life scenarios is not sufficient to realize
justice, yet clearly coherency is a necessary component of a just and proper rule of law.
The rule of law is historically tied to protection from violence and defense of civil
liberties. In the United States the rule of law applies not just to civilians but rather to
government as well. Laws in the U.S. provide a measuring stick to ensure that both the
government and its people honor a predetermined set of rules. Anti-discrimination laws, due
process, 22 and equal protections can be traced to a fundamental understanding of the
importance of protecting the rule of law. 23
Particularly in immigration law, the notion of the “rule of law” is often used in a highly
rhetorical sense and means, in fact, whatever the speaker intends.24 Law makers, the media,

22

“Due process” as used here refers to a fundamental sense of fairness protected in criminal proceedings including
the right to know the charges brought, the right to representation, and the right to a fair trial.
23
Samuel Donnelly, “Reflecting on the Rule of Law: Its Reciprocal Relation with Rights, Legitimacy, and Other
Concepts and Institutions,” Annals 603 no. 1, (January 2006): 37-53.
24
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 139.
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academics, and the public use the “rule of law” to promote their political agenda. Indeed, the
opening remarks to a 1997 report by the Commission on Immigration Reform read as follows:
“We are a nation of immigrants, dedicated to the rule of the law. That is our history –
and it is our challenge to ourselves….It is literally a matter of who we are as a nation and who
we become as a people. E Pluribus Unum. Out of many, one. One people, the American
people.” 25
There are a variety of ways to conceive of the rule of law and hidden assumptions which
may change the meaning of the phrase. According to Motomura in “The Rule of Law in
Immigration Law,” there have been three distinct understandings of the concept of the rule of
law under immigration law in the U.S. The first is “immigration as contract,” the second
“immigration as affiliation,” and the third “immigration as transition.” Of the three
perspectives the two that are prevalent in modern mainstream media are the notions of
immigration as a simple contract and immigration as affiliation. 26
Immigration as a simple contract claims that the execution of the rule of law works as an
agreement between two parties; the government and the immigrant. The simple contract view
of immigration law reduces immigration law issues to a matter of agreement. Individuals
interested in participating are expected to sign on to a set of predetermined expectations as
outlined and enforced by the government. The view therefore emphasizes “enforcement only”

25

Barbara Jordon, August 1995. Chair, U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform “Becoming an American:
Immigration and Immigrant Policy” December 14, 1993-January 17, 1996.
26
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 142.
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methods as viable strategies for protecting the rule of law. 27 Immigration law is written by the
will of the people via the legislative branch, and immigrants through their presence in our
nation have a responsibility to respect the terms of the contract. This model presupposes that
there is something distinctly different between the rights of citizens and those of non-citizens.
While citizens have the right to liberty, due process, equal treatment, and legal representation;
non-citizens may not. 28
Immigration as affiliation emphasizes not a contractual agreement between two parties
but rather a totality of circumstances including both the government’s and immigrants’
interests. It suggests there is something inherently important to family ties, good moral
character, positive contributions to the land and economy, and a long history of living as a “law
abiding” individual. If immigrants set down roots and contribute to the land and its people,
immigration as affiliation considers the immigrant’s presence justified. 29 In the history of
immigration law outlined here, examples abound of laws written from either dominant
perspective. Examples of laws written from a contractual understanding of immigration law
include the Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882 and IIRAIRA of 1996. 30 Examples of laws written via
an affiliation perspective of immigration law include the Hart-Cellar Act of 1965 and IRCA
Amnesty program of 1986. 31

27

“Enforcement-only policies” focus solely on ensuring society follows the letter of the law often to the exclusion
of considering the appropriateness of the law, the factors motivating breaking the law, and/or the law’s
effectiveness.
28
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 139-153.
29
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 143.
30
th
47 Congress Session I, 1882; Pub.L. 104-208 (1996).
31
Pub L. 89-236, 1965; Pub. L. 99-603 (1986). These provisions are discussed in greater depth on pages 23-24.
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I would argue that an understanding of the rule of immigration law as a matter of
affiliation has two significant deficiencies. First, immigration law as strictly a question of
affiliation is illogical in that it assumes presence, ties, roots, and a good record have no
beginning. It does not provide a thoughtful response to those who have broken immigration
laws and yet have not been here long enough to develop these desirable characteristics. A
second deficiency is that it does not adequately address civil immigration law violations, the
notion of deterrence, and questions of sovereignty. Violating laws must have consequences if
the ruling authority is to be credible.32 Good conduct and meaningful connections to the United
States may simply not suffice to justify regularizing the status of significant and repeated
immigration law offenders. Other areas of law recognize that legal violations carry
consequences. Drivers slow down when they see a police car precisely because they are aware
if caught there will be a monetary consequence to speeding. The voting public has determined
safety on the roads is important enough to enforce and has therefore given power to
authorities to enforce laws with hopes of protecting it.33 Traffic laws would have no meaning if
compliance were optional based on good character, family ties, and humanitarian concerns.
Likewise, immigration laws written solely based on affiliation considerations would lack
meaning and credibility.
Conversely, an understanding of immigration law as a contract addresses sovereignty
concerns as well as consequences for breaking the law. A strictly contractual view, however, is
incomplete and likely to lead to draconian laws that do not consider the totality of

32
33

Donnelly, “Reflecting on the Rule of Law,” 37.
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 142.
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circumstances. I would argue that a complex view of immigration as contract is more
appropriate, as it considers the law’s subjectivity both as it is written as well as interpreted and
applied which demands discretion and due process. A complex view of the rule of law
recognizes that a lack of discretion and due process for non-citizens is unjustified not only from
a general human rights perspective but also given the plethora of mixed status families present
in the U.S.34 It further considers the unspoken policy of acceptance of immigration violations
via the lack of sanctions on the business community which capitalizes on the contributions of
undocumented immigrants through the supply of cheap labor and access to cheaper goods and
services.
A clear example of this is found in the 1986 IRCA legalization. The provision was passed
in part due to the stipulations included to prevent the recruiting and hiring of undocumented
workers. 35 Yet little meaningful implementation and even less enforcement occurred. More
recently the half-hearted implementation of E-verify comes to mind.36 While intended to
electronically spot the use of improperly registered social security numbers, its optional
participation and faulty design truncates its effectiveness.
The realities of a lack of discretion and very limited due process as well as a lack of
sanctions on employers contravene the notion of immigration as contract.37 Equality in the law
is not the basis of justice under the contract view, rather it is protecting the expectations of

34

A mixed status family is comprised of some family members with lawful immigration status and others without
status. According to Jeffrey Passel at the Pew Hispanic Center, 79% of children born to unauthorized immigrants
are part of mixed status families. Jeffrey S. Passel and Paul Taylor, Pew Hispanic Center, August 11, 2010.
35
Pub. L. 99-603 (1986).
36
E-verify, www.dhs.gov-E-verify last updated April 6, 2011 (accessed May 7, 2011).
37
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 139-153.
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those writing and enforcing the law. There are two main parties involved in the “contract” of
immigration law: the government and immigrants. To the extent that immigrants fail to abide
by the agreement set forth by governing bodies, the contract has been broken and
consequences follow. The difficulty in viewing immigration law as contract is that it assumes
the law is knowable. Governing bodies break their commitment to the contract when the law is
not knowable. If immigrants are expected to comply with the terms of the agreement, the
terms must be accessible. The cases of Carlos and David evidence the law’s inaccessibility.
Despite sincere attempts to comply with the government’s expectations, their parents fail to do
so as a result of the law’s ambiguity, constantly changing laws, and uneven application.
Additionally, as minors, Carlos and David are held indefinitely responsible for decisions they did
not make.
One key component to enhancing respect for the rule of law is “treating like cases
alike.” 38 If the law is simplified to a functioning contract which dictates relatively
straightforward expectations, then it follows that mechanisms to ensure uniform applicability
and properly executed determinations will be less necessary. 39 A lack of meaningful federal
immigration law has encouraged some states to take matters into their own hands. An
example of an overly simplistic strictly contractual understanding of immigration law can be

38
39

Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 139-153.
Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 142.
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found most recently in the controversial Arizona state legislation known as SB 1070 passed
summer of 2010. 40
One portion of the legislation authorized public officials such as police officers to check
immigration status during any encounter with a civilian. The law requires that immigrants must
carry identification verifying their lawful status, suggesting that one particular document exists
which carries self-evident status verification. If an immigrant fails to carry this “status
document” he or she is subject to detention and possible removal through ICE involvement.
The “contract” between government and immigrant is that government officials will stop and
detain immigrants if they do not produce their “status document.”
This application of law is overly simplistic and fails to consider factors which make
abiding by the contract virtually impossible for immigrants through possibly no fault of their
own. In reality, a person may be here lawfully without any documents to prove it (for example
Cubans, deferred action grantees, etc.) or conversely may be here unlawfully with legally issued
documents which suggest otherwise (such as an Employment Authorization Document holder
whose underlying adjustment of status was denied). For example, status documents often
have expiration dates imprinted that no longer correspond to the facts of the case. This
includes work authorization cards whose underlying basis has been terminated thus rendering
apparently current documents null and void. This demonstrates the nuanced layers which
render a simple violation of the contract of SB 1070 implausible. Laws formed from simple
contractual understandings, like SB 1070, may be nearly impossible for immigrants to obey or
40

Arizona State Legislature, “SB 1070 Technical Correction; Unlawful Aliens; Transporting,”
http://www.azleg.gov/DocumentsForBill.asp?Bill_Number=Sb1070&session_Id=102&image.x=8&image.y=10
(accessed February 24, 2011).
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the government to meaningfully enforce. Furthermore, properly written and applied federal
laws would preclude state governments from establishing laws concerning a clearly federal
matter.
Additionally, one must consider the sheer volume of differing documents which may be
used to verify lawful status: 41 “green cards” (of which three different styles are still valid and in
circulation), I-797 Welcome Notices for lawful permanent residents, work authorization cards,
refugee/asylee/Cuban I-94s, non-immigrant visas, non-immigrant I-94s and approval notices,
deferred action grants, withholding of removal grants, I-797 letters of extension for conditional
residents, and many more. To suggest that non-immigration government officials should be
able to identify valid status documents under current immigration policy is ludicrous. Indeed,
many experienced immigration practitioners and officers of immigration themselves are unable
to do so without significant research. None-the-less immigration as a simple contract claims
that immigrants are responsible to protect the expectations of those writing and enforcing the
law, however impossible such expectations may be in actuality. This impedes not only the right
of the individual immigrant to know and understand what is expected of him, it threatens the
credibility and effectiveness of laws written. Finally, it seems to invite arbitrary application of
the “rules,” limiting the possibility of effective accountability of authorities.
A less simplistic view of justice in immigration law recognizes that the law is ambiguous
and must be applied to a nearly infinite combination of life circumstances and human decisions.
As a result of the vast variability of cases, informed discretion is necessary. Such discretion

41

Lawful status is defined in 6CFR 37.3.
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must in turn be held accountable by due process. Without such provisions the integrity of the
“rule of law” is virtually nonexistent. 42
Discourse theory provides a useful tool when considering language and power in
immigration law, shedding light on the dynamics of the use of the phrase “rule of law.”
Assessed through the lens of discourse theory, immigration-as-simple contract fails immigrants
and citizens alike. According to Foucault, discourses operate by conditioning the possible,
giving legitimacy to the speakers (those with power) and creating future discourse. The
immigration policy of the United States has been heavily influenced by discursive power
dynamics since the nation’s inception. From the sanctioned historical use of the term “alien” to
describe non-citizens in the governing statutory body of law to the assumption of opposition
between national security and immigration reform in modern day rhetoric, the topic of
immigration to the U.S. provides an easy arena for analysis of discursive power.
The dichotomy of restrictive versus open immigration and enforcement versus
legalization reform continues to be prevalent today in the discourse on American immigration.
As with any oppositional framework, such discourse limits the possibility of conceptualizing
policy alternatives. 43 It places the options in a binary relationship where only two possibilities
are conceivable: either pro-immigration or anti-immigration, pro-restriction and the “rule of
the law” as discussed above, or pro-immigrant and “welcoming the stranger.” The binary
nature of open versus closed door policies and protection of civil rights versus insistence on the
importance of national security frames the complex issues in such a way that limit the

42
43

Motomura, “The Rule of Law in Immigration Law,” 139-153.
Edward Said, Orientalism (New York: Random House Inc, October 1979), 46.
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possibilities of understanding. Such discursive limitations inhibit policy makers’ ability to not
only understand the topic but to creatively formulate comprehensive policies. Edward Said’s
book Orientalism makes a powerful case for the impact discursive reality has on material
reality, and American immigration policy is no different.44
The discourse of immigration in the United States is hidden even as it is obvious. 45 The
latent nature of hegemonic discourse enables that which is dominant to retain its power. It is
only by bringing to light the impact of such common sense assumptions taken for granted by all
(legislative bodies, implementing bodies, the voting public, and immigrants themselves) that
the power of the dominant discourse may be acknowledged and alternatives may be
envisioned. 46
According to Edward Said in Orientalism, dominant hegemonic discourse is dangerous
not because it is limited in its abilities to describe, understand, and know, but rather because it
pretends not to be. 47 The modern discourse of “following the rule of the law” assumes a
positivism that the law 1) is consistent with Congressional intent 2) is knowable and
understandable 3) is possible to consistently be extrapolated to real-life scenarios (for both
adjudication officers and immigrants) 4) is internally consistent such that obeying the terms of
one section will not violate the terms of another.

44

Said, Orientalism, 58.
Examples touched on here include Edward Said’s notion of “other-izing” found in the terms “alien” and “illegals,”
the oppositional framework of immigration reform versus immigration enforcement, and a presumption of
positivism in the law (that the law is objective by nature).
46
Said, Orientalism, 116.
47
Said, Orientalism, 116.
45
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In the Carlos case, the end result of a permanently barred 5 year old whose family
resides legally in the United States is clearly inconsistent with Congressional intent in writing
IIRAIRA. The convoluted terms of the law have limited its accessibility and encouraged
inconsistent application. Finally, the logical inconsistency is evident of exempting children from
accruing unlawful presence for the 10 year bar and not for the permanent bar.
Legal and Social Precedents for Special Consideration of Minors
The concept of “child” and “childhood” is a modern development, heavily influenced by
western thought and practice. Philippe Aries is credited with the first historical study of the
notion of childhood in his work Centuries of Childhood published in 1960. 48 Despite just fifty
years of analysis, conclusions regarding the nature of childhood and appropriate treatment of
children have varied significantly since that time.
The foundation for a philosophy of the child is often credited to John Locke (1632-1704)
who argued that children are not fully rational and are therefore in need of an education to
learn to reason. A being that lacks full ability to reason lacks the ability to choose freely and as
a result is dependent on others for moral and rational decisions. Locke believed knowledge was
learned through experience, and viewed children as “imperfect, incomplete versions of their
adult selves.” 49 Locke’s perspective of the child sees children as dependent beings not fully
formed, and not only vulnerable toward those who would harm but actually incapable of selfdirection, as not just people lacking a voice but as incapable of having a voice.

48
49

David Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood (London & New York: Routledge, 1993), 15.
Archard, Children: Rights and Childhood, 2.
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Much law and policy regarding minors concurs with John Locke’s view. A clear legal
example of this is found in the definition and application of statutory rape. The notion of
statutory rape views minors as incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse with adults. 50
State laws seek to protect minors from abusive sexual relationships which often involve a
severe difference of power, yet in so doing take a minor’s agency away by their seemingly
arbitrary application. For example, a seventeen year old minor dating a forty year old male may
be considered a victim of statutory rape as might a seventeen year old minor in a relationship
with a twenty-one year old. 51
The notion of “childhood” as a distinct time frame in a person’s life is a relatively recent
phenomenon. Modern childhood very much involves a separation from the adult world:
children are responsible for playing, socializing, and learning, work is largely left to adults. They
are distinguished from adults from a number of different viewpoints. Children are considered
unable to be held responsible for many choices due to their moral immaturity, are considered
incapable of mature reasoning abilities, and are dependent upon adults for meeting their basic
needs. They are further sexually distinct from adults in their immaturity and physical inability
to procreate as well as their social aptitude restricting their participation in community
leadership.52
Yet between the late 1960s to early 1970s theories of childhood developed which
sought to liberate children from the oppressions of the adult world. With the growth of the
language of “rights” came an emphasis on the need to protect children’s basic rights for safety,
50
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shelter, and sustenance but also to recognize the autonomy and self-determination of children
in their choices regarding schooling, travel, dress, and guardianship. Additionally, modern
socialization theory emphasizes the importance of children being socialized with other children
(assuming children cannot learn proper socialization from adults). Children spend their time in
daycare or school with peers, at church children are placed in the nursery or taken to
“children’s church,” etc. The life of a child in modern western society is very distinct from the
adult world.53
This was not always the case, however. It was not until the economic development of
the west in the late 1700s to early 1800s that children were able to quit working alongside
adults and focus on school instead.54 As social roles changed so did children’s dress and
demeanor. Prior to the industrial revolution children were depicted in paintings as mini adults.
Boys looked like miniature versions of men, girls like mini-women. Common children’s dress
was simply a smaller version of adult clothing, and children played games (such as gambling)
which are today considered appropriate only for adults.55 In the mid-late 1800s children
became dependent creatures, fathers worked industrial jobs away from the home and mother’s
had fewer children and therefore more closely sheltered their children at home. Additionally,
the gap between genders grew, evidenced in increasingly genderized children’s clothing and
toys.
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Initially, protecting and segregating children was encouraged by the philanthropic
realm. 56 The state was hesitant to intervene as child rearing was a sacred right to be
implemented by the family. Philanthropists promoted a proper childhood as a romantic worryfree time of life devoted to learning, development, and play in the protection of the home
nurtured by mom and financed by dad.
The rhetoric of the separation of state and family decisions for children began to change
when a new emphasis was placed on the political agenda’s need to form a competitive state.
Protection of the child shifted from philanthropy to governmental entities in the late 1890s in
the U.S. With the state involvement childhood became increasingly distinct from adulthood
through compulsory education, the establishment of the juvenile justice system, and the
development of child-labor laws. 57 The establishment of juvenile courts occurred first in Illinois
in 1899; and was based predominantly on a model which emphasized reform rather than
retribution. The courts were given preventative powers and sentences were indeterminate in
that they were adjusted based on a child’s behavior in response to punishment. Finally, the
juvenile courts implemented a probationary system designed to capitalize on adult mentoring
and rewards for good behavior. 58
Scholars today point to the modern irony in the study and analysis of childhood and
protection of children’s rights. On the one hand children have been increasingly categorized as
a select group in need of special protections and legal exceptions due to their dependent
nature and inability to reason fully as adults can. This logic suggests that as children are limited
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in their ability to reason they should be afforded special leniency and protections from
themselves and others. On the other hand the discourse of rights and the best interest of the
child promote treating children as independent self-sufficient beings (adults) with agency,
autonomy, and power. Scholars have pointed out the inconsistencies between the two
perspectives of the child and the need for consensus amongst advocates both in dialogue and
implementation. 59
The desire to pit the two perspectives against one another is natural yet unnecessary.
To the contrary, the best interests of a child are compatible with the notion of a need for
special protections and provisions. The best interests of an autonomous adult are frequently
illusive, how much more clouded those of a child who is limited in language, functionality, and
reasoning ability. In nearly every arena of law in the United States the best interest of the child
is a standard which carries significant weight in decision making. This is true in welfare law,
custody and guardianship proceedings, and child abuse and neglect to name a few. Labor laws
protect children’s interests by preventing exploitation, and compulsory education laws provide
all children with the right to a basic education. 60 It is my assertion that a failure to protect the
best interests of children in immigration law is not only inconsistent with legal precedents and
our declared national values; it is often lastingly harmful to both foreign national and citizen
children as well as universal respect for the law.
My assertion is not that the best interest of the child is the only important consideration
in immigration law adjudication. Clearly this would be an over simplification. It is not that the
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U.S. government ought to routinely ignore national security or economic considerations.
Rather, the best interest of the child should provide a starting point both for writing and
implementing effectual immigration laws. Children hold two significant claims to their interests
being taken seriously: first, they are uniformly innocent of decisions to break laws, and second,
they are and always have been the foundation of society. Throughout history societies that
invest in children’s protection and education, and by extension the family as their nucleus of
support and formation, are healthy, productive, and successful. Indeed considering the true
“best interests of the child” refers to both policies that are child-centered allowing the voice of
a child to be heard, as well as a substantive legal standard that considers the “safety,
permanency, and well-being of the child” in immigration proceedings. 61
When considering the flaws in immigration law as regards protecting children’s best
interests it is important to understand the history of immigration law in the U.S. One of the
oldest aspects of immigration law involves the word “alien.” The term alien is a legal term for
all foreign national non-citizens and is still commonly used today, over two hundred years later.
It has been in use in U.S. immigration policy since prior to 1798 when President John Adams
signed the Naturalization Act (also known as the Alien Act). The Alien Act clarified the number
of years a free white person must reside in America for the purposes of citizenship.62
The Chinese Exclusion Act went into effect as early as 1882 prohibiting Chinese from
immigrating to the United Sates and deeming the over one hundred thousand Chinese already
present ineligible for citizenship. In 1917 the Immigration Act commonly known as the
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“Literacy Act” or the “Asian Barred Zone Act” not only restricted all immigrants based on
literacy levels, it was also responsible for deeming non-Japanese or Philippine Asians as
ineligible to become citizens based solely on ethnic origin. 63 In 1921 Congress passed the first
quota act limiting annual immigration from any given country to three percent of the
population already living in the United States as of the 1910 census. The quota act was
amended several times but was the main governing body of law until 1952 and essentially
served white Europeans to protect them as the majority race of America. 64
While the Chinese Exclusion Act was repealed in 1943, the Asian Barred Zone Act was
not officially changed until 1952.65 The current federalized body of immigration law was unified
in 1952 and is still known today as the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA). In it, all blanket
exclusions based solely on race were abolished although significant preference was still granted
to white Europeans. 66 The INA dramatically altered the face of immigration policy as it codified
U.S. immigration law into one centralized governing body of law. While it continued much of
the previously existing quota system, the INA placed new importance on the question of
national security. In light of the Cold War and the fear of communism, such a development is
perhaps not surprising.
By 1965 the Civil Rights movement was well underway. There was a newfound
emphasis on tolerance and humanitarianism as a reaction to the fear driven policies of the Cold
War. Under the Lyndon Johnson administration, changes in immigration law reflected the
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rising value of equality and the basic human rights of all, regardless of ethnicity. Congress
passed a significant overhaul of the 1952 version of the INA abolishing the quota system and
instead establishing a system focused on family reunification. The dramatic change in the
structure of immigration to the U.S. brought about by the 1965 amendment known as the HartCeller Act conceived of a system not based on race or national security but rather on the
importance of family and value for relationship.67 The effect of the overhaul of immigration law
through the Act was to bring the best and the brightest by recruiting those with skills and
resources, as well as those least educated and with fewest skills through the new emphasis on
family reunification. Today one-third of all U.S. Noble Prize winners are immigrants.
Immigrants are over represented among people with doctorates in the U.S. as well as those
who have not graduated high school. 68
Immigration policy in the U.S. is often formed as a reaction to the current political
nature of our country’s relationship to immigrants. The dichotomy of restrictive
immigration/open immigration and enforcement/legalization reform continues to be prevalent
today in the discourse of American immigration. As with any oppositional framework, such
discourse limits the possibilities of conceptualizing policy alternatives. It places the options in a
binary relationship where only two possibilities are conceivable: either pro immigration or antiimmigration, pro-restriction and the “rule of the law” as denoted in popular modern day
rhetoric, or pro-immigrant and welcoming the new comer.
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Since the early 1600s immigration has been closely tied to race and equality discourse,
both in inclusive and exclusive terms. The Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
from 1865 points to this fact:
“Nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws. These provisions are universal in their application, to all persons within the
territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of
nationality, and the protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws
(emphasis added).”
It is difficult if not impossible for those with strong opinions on immigration law in this country
(which in 2011 includes nearly the entire adult population) to separate racial concerns from the
debate. Indeed, whether from white guilt or ignorance, overt racism, or minority anger, the
immigration debate is laced with racial discourse much the same way yeast infects dough.69
Similarly, immigration law in the United States has been historically tied to our
economic policies. When the economy is flourishing and demand for menial labor is high,
immigration tends to skyrocket and politicians begin discussing guest worker programs and
legalization. The popularly known bracero program serves as a key example. Instituted in 1942
by executive order in response to the labor vacuum caused by World War II, the bracero
program (formally known as the “Labor Importation Program”) allotted entry and work permits
for much needed foreign agricultural workers. The program did not end when the war
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finished, however, but continued until it was terminated in 1964 by the U.S. Labor Department
officer in charge named Lee Williams, who dubbed it “legalized slavery.” 70 In sharp contrast to
the booming economy of the bracero period, when the U.S. economy is weak (such as the
recent economic downturn in 2008 with the stock and housing crisis) immigrants tend to be
scape-goated as an economic burden to be eliminated.
According to Zolberg in A Nation by Design, there is a widely held assumption that a
laissez-faire attitude toward immigration has dominated immigration policy and as such that
immigration policy has historically been lax and welcoming. Zolberg challenges this notion
pointing to the history of immigration law in the United States as support for his view that
Americans cling tightly to their right to decide who may be allowed in and who must be kept
out. Whether based on ethnic or language differences, religious roots, or educational/socioeconomic differences, America has intentionally and systematically shaped its populace.71
America was designed initially through state-led immigration laws as there was no
unifying federal body. Its main focus was on questions of slavery and how citizens were to be
defined. Prior to 1870 only “free white people” residing in the United States were considered
to be eligible for citizenship. 72 Lack of federal laws governing immigration does not necessarily
point to a liberal stance on immigration, however. Rather it speaks to the climate of concern
over states’ rights at the time. 73
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The United States is popularly known as a land of immigrants, and in many respects this
continues to be true. Approximately 12% of today’s U.S. population consists of people born
outside of the U.S. The U.S. receives the highest actual number of immigrants annually in the
world. 74 Comparing the annual percentage of population in the U.S. to other high immigrant
receiving states, however, other states far outstrip the U.S. in acceptance rates of immigrants.
Australia’s foreign born population is steady at 22.2% since 1995, Switzerland registers 22.89%,
and 19.8% of those residing in Canada are foreign born. 75
The relatively small percentage of immigrants the U.S. receives is emblematic of the
country’s design. Much as an architect begins a building project with specific plans in mind, the
historical population of America since the arrival of the British has been predetermined. From
the arrival of European immigrants in the 1700s, the slaughter and relegation of the Native
American population, and the beginnings of official immigration law in the late 1800s which
severely restricted Asian immigration, the leaders of the land today known as the United States
have jealously guarded their right to draw clear cut citizenship distinctions between “us” and
“them.” 76
America has been a self-constituted nation since the arrival of the British and their
widespread killing of natives and subjugation of black slaves. The standard has been historically
evident: healthy able-bodied whites are normative even as people of color are different and
less favored. From modern white American fears that immigrants (today brown Spanish-
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speaking immigrants) may be unable to assimilate based on cultural and language differences,
to pre-Civil Rights era jargon fearing differences brought by the waves of Irish and Asian
immigrants, America has a historical narrative of immigration as one which is intrinsically tied
to difference in race.77
While some contend that the U.S. is extremely lax in its immigration policies (pointing to
the high levels of undocumented immigration and the popular perception that the U.S. is a land
of immigrants), the important debate is not so much whether the U.S. takes an active role in
guiding and controlling immigration, but rather who it controls and how. 78 Should Congress
have total authority over immigration laws? Given the prevailing plenary power doctrine as the
basis of governance of immigration law, to what extent should other branches of the
government or other institutions provide checks and balances? Whose interests should be
served in U.S. immigration policies? What priority if any should be given to the interests of
immigrants?
IIRAIRA: Specific Failures in Immigration Law for Minors
Congress determined to act decisively through the Illegal Immigration Reform and
Immigrant Responsibility Act (IIRAIRA), a stiff statutory provision which was passed in
September of 1996.79 IIRAIRA touches on a variety of subjects within immigration law related
to criminal and noncriminal aliens, the definition of due process, and the terminology and
practice in the removal process. More specifically as regards criminal aliens, IIRAIRA expands
77
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the definition of both “felony” and “conviction” under immigration law and removes the
Attorney General’s power to exercise discretion in waivers for many offenses. Through the law
removal proceedings replaced previous authority governing deportation and exclusion
proceedings. Additionally, expectations of due process were changed significantly through the
establishment of expedited removals (INA 235 and INA 238). Such removals allow
administrative officers at points of entry and elsewhere the authority to remove individuals
without the need for judicial review.
The inception of reinstatement of removal originates in IIRAIRA. Reinstatement amends
245(a)(5) under IIRAIRA 305(a), making a person removable who re-enters the U.S. prior to
complying with the terms of his/her deportation or removal (an exception applies to those who
first obtain consent to do so from the Attorney General). For example, a person who is
removed from the United States at the government’s expense is given a bar from re-entry (prior
to IIRAIRA inadmissibility bars were 1 year and deportation bars were 5 years, post IIRAIRA
most are 10 years). If an individual who was deported or removed re-enters undocumented
without first remaining outside the country according to the requisite bar, the original removal
order may be subsequently reinstated. Reinstatement precludes the possibility of discretionary
relief under the statute. While reinstatement issues can be cured if the individual is eligible for
consular processing (obtaining a lawful immigrant visa at an embassy abroad), many applicants
for immigrant visas abroad while not subject to reinstatement are precluded from gaining
residency due to the permanent bar.
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The real controversy surrounding reinstatement, however, is the change in the terms of
the deportation or removal requiring the individual to remain outside the country for a
specified time. Prior to IIRAIRA, many who were deported or excluded were given a one year
bar from re-entry. Since IIRAIRA, however, the bar for re-entry in most cases is ten years.
Because reinstatement is applied retroactively, a person who was deported in 1996 and reentered unlawfully in 1997 believing he/she complied with the one year bar may now be
reinstated for violating the terms of deportation/removal! Effectively, the government
converts the terms of the original removal to a ten year bar and holds the individual
accountable for having violated the changed terms of deportation. While clearly the unlawful
entry is problematic in and of itself, to change a punishment and its consequences for violation
without informing the violator is fundamentally unjust under other U.S. laws. 80
For many immigrants otherwise eligible to regularize their status in the family
reunification context, Congressional intent under IIRAIRA took a severe stance against
undocumented immigration. True to its title, the provision largely sought to annihilate illegal
entries to the U.S. as well as make life untenable for those already present unlawfully.
Historically there were thirty-one specific grounds of exclusion barring applicants for immigrant
visas from realizing permanent residency. These grounds for exclusion were summarized into
nine categories of inadmissibility as a result of the Immigration Amendments Act of 1990, and
additional penalties for unlawful presence or prior removals followed by travel for foreign
nationals were established through IIRAIRA in response to the World Trade Center bombing of

80

Constitution of the United States, Sixth Amendment. Re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273-74 (1948),
http://www.lectlaw.com/def/d080.htm (accessed March 13, 2011).

32

1993.81 Working hand in hand with IIRAIRA, Congress passed the Enhanced Border Security and
Visa Entry Reform Act in 2002. This act was designed to improve Department of State (DOS)
and Department of Homeland Security’s ability (DHS) to track foreign national travel in and out
of the U.S. and thus practically enforce IIRAIRA’s crack down on immigration violators.82
Ironically, rather than reducing clandestine immigration, the real impact of IIRAIRA was
to reduce cyclical migration (entering for a few months to work during harvest season and save
money to return home) via increased border security, removals, and the formation of stiff
consequences for accumulating “unlawful presence” and subsequently leaving the U.S. Many
in the family reunification context who were awaiting a priority date to immigrate permanently
anecdotally report they would enter occasionally to visit family members and save money for
migration once their visa was available. With the passage of IIRAIRA and the increasingly
difficult journey to enter the U.S. unlawfully, many immigrants ceased travel. Family
reunification and comparative economic opportunities being what they were, immigrants have
come and stayed rather than not coming at all. This is evidenced by annual statistical reports
published by DHS estimating the numbers of foreign nationals present unlawfully. As of
January 2009, DHS estimates a population of 10.8 million here unlawfully. From 2000-2008 the
unlawfully present population grew by twenty-seven percent. 83 Significantly, this growth has
occurred post the passage and implementation of IIRAIRA.
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While academics and practitioners alike have reviewed the harsh nature of IIRAIRA and
its consequences since its inception thirteen years ago, most critics have focused on the
provision’s impact on criminal aliens and their family members along with changes in the
removal system. The focus on criminal aliens and removal proceedings is in part due to the
unprecedented lack of due process in these areas as well as a fundamental assumption in U.S.
criminal law that the consequence of a violation should be proportionate to the offense. Much
analysis of the removal process and rights of criminal aliens has been conducted in light of
IRAIRA’s impact even as the creation of unlawful presence and false claims bars have widely
been ignored. While due process for criminal aliens is certainly an important issue of justice, it
is crucial that we not ignore the significant consequences for non criminal aliens under IIRAIRA.
In advocates’ fervor to expound on the disproportionately harsh nature of IIRAIRA for relatively
minor offences; we unintentionally ignore IIRAIRA’s life-altering consequences for non-criminal
aliens, particularly innocent minors lacking the independence and agency to break civil law.
Administrative processes under the INA are those processes handled outside of
immigration court proceedings. Citizenship and Immigration Services (under the auspices of
the Department of Homeland Security) and the Department of State (responsible for running
the American embassies abroad) represent the federal agencies carrying out Congressional
mandates as regards administrative immigration processes (all applications for immigration
benefits applied for affirmatively, i.e., outside of the defense context). Regulations,
memoranda, and cables are all written by these branches to clarify the practical application of
Congressional intent as put forth in the statute.
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For non-criminal aliens outside of removal proceedings, IIRAIRA dramatically changes
the consequences of illegal presence in the U.S. by establishing unlawful presence bars as a
ground for inadmissibility (detailed in INA Sec. 212(a)). Despite the widespread impact of
unlawful presence bars on the possibility of legally immigrating, as of February 2011 no
regulations have been written. Instead, a fifty-two page agency memo brings definition to
unlawful presence.84 IIRAIRA changes the definition and severity of making a false claim to
citizenship by making a person who falsely declares U.S. citizenship to any governmental
authority permanently ineligible for residency. No pardon is available for such an offense for an
intending immigrant.85
There are several additional unintended consequences resulting from the now nearly
fifteen years of implementation of IIRAIRA. Many directly affect children, both U.S. children
and undocumented children alike. The provision in IIRAIRA which carries the most significant
consequences for non-criminal aliens seeking family reunification relates to the creation of
unlawful presence and the punishments which ensue. In a study conducted through the
Congressional Research Service, statistical analysis revealed that from FY1996-FY2000 the
leading reason for permanent residency denial by Department of State (DOS) was a finding of
inadmissibility due to being likely public charges. By FY2004 the rejection numbers based on
public charge inadmissibility had dropped significantly, and by FY2008, unlawful presence and
prior removal orders outstripped public charge as the leading ground.86 There could be several
explanations for this change including additional concrete policy guidance regarding affidavit of
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support requirements to establish an applicant is not likely to be a public charge as well as a
streamlining of the procedural implementation of the new rules. What the research does
reveal, however, is the significant impact IIRAIRA has on non-criminal aliens otherwise eligible
for residency. Further research is needed as regards the rate of denials for minor applicants
based on these grounds. The following “Carlos case” is a composite from my experience
representing immigrants in administrative proceedings and elucidates the impact of these
changes for some minors.
Carlos was born in Mexico to Mexican national parents with lawful permanent residency
in the United States. His parents were temporarily living in Mexico while they finished their
higher education, and just before Carlos’ second birthday they completed their schooling and
moved to the U.S. having obtained a nonimmigrant tourist visa for Carlos. (Though Carlos’
immigrant relative petition had been pending for a year, he still had seven years to wait to
obtain his residency via his green card holding father). Carlos was issued a permit based on his
tourist visa to enter the United States with his parents, valid for just six months.
Once in Chicago, his parents took advantage of their education and obtained good
paying jobs, put down roots in a local church community, and had two more children (born in
Chicago and therefore citizens at birth). When Carlos was 5 his maternal grandmother
suddenly became ill and died. The entire family left within twenty-four hours to support
extended family in Mexico and prepare for the funeral arrangements. Driving home to Texas
after the funeral, the parents presented their green cards at the border unconscious of the fact
that their five year old son’s permit had expired long before they had left the U.S. potentially
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making it difficult to obtain another for reentry. Luckily, the border patrol officer failed to ask
for the children’s documents at the point of entry. The family returned to their home in Texas
in time for Carlos to start kindergarten.
Two years later Carlos’ petition was finally ready to be processed for residency, and he
and his father went to the American embassy in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico for his adjudication
interview. At the interview, the facts of seven year old Carlos’ case were innocently disclosed in
full. Rather than issuing the long awaited green card, however, the adjudication officer denied
Carlos’ residency and instead gave him a permanent bar from being able to fix his papers. How
could such a seemingly innocent scenario lead a seven year old to permanent ineligibility for
legal reunification with his family in the United States? Was the immigration officer right under
governing immigration laws to not only deny Carlos’ residency but permanently bar him for the
future?
The statutes leading to Carlos’ bar to residency are found in INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(B) 87 and
(C). 88 Sec. 212(a)(9)(B) bars anyone who accumulates over six months or one year of unlawful
presence and subsequently exits the U.S. with a three and ten year bar to obtaining legal status;
respectively. A fifty-two page memorandum published by the United States Citizenship and
Immigration Services (USCIS) lays forth a very complex definition of unlawful presence; most
people unlawfully present are such as a result of having either entered the country illegally or
87
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having over-stayed their non-immigrant permission to be here. Sec. 212(a)(9)(C) is an even
stiffer provision which applies a permanent bar to legal status to anyone who either
accumulates more than one year of unlawful presence, exits, and then re-enters or attempts to
re-enter without inspection, or who enters without inspection or attempts to after having been
removed.
As a result of IIRAIRA, therefore, any person unlawfully present for more than 365 days
who subsequently leaves the United States and re-enters without inspection receives a
permanent bar to admission to the United States. No exception for minor children. The statute
is found in INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(C) and is worded as follows:
“In general any alien who has been unlawfully present in the United States for an
aggregate period of more than 1 year, or has been ordered removed under section…or
under any provision of law, and who enters or attempts to reenter the United States
without being admitted is inadmissible.”
Ironically, INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(B) which addresses the definition of unlawful presence statutorily
exempts children. “No period of time in which an alien is under 18 years of age shall be taken
into account in determining the period of unlawful presence in the United States….”
Up until 2007, the American embassy in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico was among several
embassies which upheld the interpretation that if a person was exempted from accruing
unlawful presence for purposes of INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(B) (commonly known as the ten-year bar)
then he or she was likewise exempted from INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(C) (known as the permanent bar)
for having entered without inspection subsequent to accrual of unlawful presence.
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Unfortunately for Carlos and many other children like him, shifts in implementation of the law
led the consulate to change their interpretation just prior to his interview.
The inconsistency for minors between the impacts of the two statutes is startling. INA
Sec. 212(a)(9)(B), the less draconian of the two sections, allows for an exception for minors
making any time accrued under age eighteen not count toward unlawful presence tallies for
purposes of the three and ten year bars. Minors are therefore not held responsible for being
present in the United States unlawfully until they turn eighteen years old, at which point they
are expected to exit the U.S. to avoid INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(B) consequences. Ironically, there is no
such stated exception in INA Sec. 212(a)(9)(C). Minors can therefore accrue unlawful presence
for the purpose of the permanent bar but not for the lesser offenses of three and ten year bars!
Though it seems highly improbable that Congress intended to punish the unlawful
presence of some children but not of others, because the law does not explicitly contain the
same exception, Department of State is free to make a determination on implementation of the
two statutes. In 1997 policy guidance issued by the former Immigration and Nationality Service
(INS) concluded that the unlawful presence exceptions to inadmissibility under 212(a)(9)(B) do
not apply to permanent bar inadmissibility under 212(a)(9)(C) and therefore children may be
issued the permanent bar. Traditionally embassies abroad applied the exception to both
statutes thereby not ascribing permanent bars to minors. However, within the past five years
the American embassy in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico began applying the same standard as the local
CIS offices. The practical impact for children leads to the possibility of being permanently
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barred from family reunification in the U.S. with no opportunity for discretionary relief until
having substantially complied with the first ten years of the bar. 89
The best interest of the child is sorely missing in immigration law determinations.
Special Immigrant Juvenile Status and U visas provide two shaky exceptions to this rule, as the
provisions provide for children’s interests in part. The U visa, most significantly, opens an
avenue for children to include derivative parents and siblings on their applications (INA
101(a)(15)(U)). 90 Unfortunately for these children, the underlying U visa eligibility is dependent
upon having undergone substantial suffering as the result of being the victim of a violent crime.
Evidence of the sore lack of consideration for children under the INA includes the child’s
inability to serve as the source of family reunification (INA Sec. 201(b)(2)(A)(i), 203(a)). 91 As
previously noted children may not be considered the requisite family member for a relative’s
waiver application; the INA provides for discretion by the Attorney General where there is
extreme hardship to the spouse or parent of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident.
Hardship to a citizen or resident child is ignored when considering discretionary relief
(212(a)(9)(B)(v). U.S. citizen adults petitioning their parents to come to the United States
frequently must choose which parent to bring despite their classification as immediate relatives
with immediate access to permanent residency status. Minor children (siblings of the U.S.
citizen) are not immediate relatives and therefore must wait in significant backlogs for
89
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residency. 92 Finally, as detailed above, there are numerous draconian provisions in IIRAIRA
which hold a child directly (and in some cases permanently) responsible for decisions adults
have made. It is important to note that these examples come from civil administrative contexts
– laws governing criminal aliens are more draconian still.93
There are other significant unintended consequences for minors, both aliens and
citizens alike. The first is IIRAIRA’s effect on the ability of twenty-one and over U.S. citizen sons
and daughters (whether through birth or naturalization) to petition their parents who entered
the U.S. illegally (even many who entered over twenty years prior). Parents of a United States
citizen are considered immediate relatives for family reunification. That is, they are not subject
to annual quotas and residency visa numbers are immediately available to them. In order to
be eligible to process their legal residency applications in the U.S. via adjustment of status,
immediate relatives are required to prove their last entry to the United States was lawful (INA
Sec. 245(a)). 94
With the exception of those immediate relatives who qualify under 245i (via having had
an approvable family petition filed on or before April 30, 2001) those who cannot prove their
last entry was lawful must leave the States to process their residency application packets at an
embassy abroad. As previously discussed, however, 212(a)(9)(B) statutorily fixes individuals
who have accrued more than six months or one year of unlawful presence with a three-year or
ten-year bar, respectively, thereby preventing barred individuals from legal residency until they
92
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have complied with the bar or been awarded a waiver. The caveat in applying for the waiver,
however, is the requirement of a qualifying citizen or resident family member to evidence
suffering extreme hardship. The terms of the waiver state the qualifying family member must
be a “parent or spouse” and do not include U.S. citizen sons and daughters. This leaves parents
of U.S. citizen adults without a legal remedy, despite the fact that they may have illegally
entered the U.S. only once in their lives. Because it is commonly known amongst the immigrant
community that twenty-one year old U.S. citizen children may petition their parents, many
parents of United States citizens (USCs) apply despite their statutory ineligibility issues.
The creation of “false claims” to citizenship via IIRAIRA carries perhaps the most
draconian consequences for minors: permanent ineligibility for any immigration benefit under
the Act, in many cases even if the claim was made as a minor. This provision makes it virtually
impossible to legally immigrate to the United States or regularize status, having made a false
claim to citizenship subsequent to the implementation of IIRAIRA. The following composite
case of “David” sheds light on the life-altering consequences of making a false claim to
citizenship, in some cases even as a minor, under IIRAIRA. Similar to the above “Carlos case”
illustrating some minor’s experience with the permanent bar, the following composite “David
case” depicts the irrational observable outcome of the law and the importance of
accountability in adjudicators’ use of discretionary powers.
In 1963 David was the son of U.S. lawful permanent resident parents (LPRs) who had
been visiting their family in Mexico when David was born. Six months later they returned to the
United States, and at the border showed their LPR cards (popularly known as green cards). The
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border patrol officer advised them to complete their son’s paperwork as soon as they arrived
home to California. Arriving to California, the couple did as instructed – they went to a notary
public (in their country on par with an attorney) and completed the process of obtaining their
son’s papers. They were advised to register David’s birth in California because he was so young
by completing some paperwork, and in exchange for the fee for service were given a copy of
their son’s birth registry from California. With the birth certificate the parents ignorantly
applied for and were issued David’s social security card.
David grew up in California, went to school, all the while living and working and traveling
as the United States citizen he believed himself to be. In his twenties he moved to Mexico for a
time with his extended family and met and married his wife and had two children. By 2003 the
family decided it was time to move back to California where most of David’s U.S. born siblings
and their families lived. In the process of applying for his wife’s legal residency before coming
over, the embassy in Ciudad Juarez discovered his birth was not actually registered in California
and the certificate was false. Under IIRAIRA, David was found guilty of making a false claim to
United States citizenship, after September 30, 1996, to an immigration officer for the purpose
of obtaining an immigration benefit. He was therefore determined to be permanently
inadmissible to the United States – his home country. The only statutory exception to exempt
David from the consequences of a false claim to citizenship requires the immigrant to be not
only physically residing in the United States before the age of 16, but also the child of two U.S.
citizen parents. While David had lived in the United States his entire life, his parents were legal
residents, not citizens.
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Under INA 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) as amended by Section 344(a) of IIRAIRA, 95 a false claim to
citizenship “for any purpose or benefit under the Act or any Federal or State law” renders the
maker of the false claim permanently inadmissible to the United States for lawful permanent
residency (a necessary first step before eligibility for citizenship). Prior to the passage of
IIRAIRA, 212(a)(6)(C)(i) was the governing authority on false claims to citizenship. 96 A false
claim to citizenship had to meet the requirements of a willful misrepresentation of a material
fact in that it is made 1) to a government official 2) for the purpose of obtaining an immigration
benefit. Similar to fraud and willful misrepresentations of material facts, false claims to
citizenship historically allowed for discretionary waivers.
The drastic difference in the standard for 212(a)(6)(C)(i) and 212(a)(6)(C)(ii) is apparent.
Pre IIRAIRA a false claim to citizenship had to be made to a government official for the purpose
of obtaining a specific immigration benefit. It essentially focused on admission questions at
ports of entry or when applying for an immigration benefit in the U.S. or abroad. If a person
lied in that context, she was found inadmissible (ineligible) to receive the immigration benefit
sought. In cases where the person had a qualifying relationship to a United States citizen or
resident and could demonstrate extreme hardship to that person due to the denial, a waiver
could be sought and the intending immigrant could be pardoned, thus providing for family
reunification. Post IIRAIRA false claims to citizenship are in a category of their own: any claim
made in any context for “any purpose or benefit” under the act or any state or federal benefit
are now included in what renders one inadmissible. False claims at points of entry and while
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applying for an immigration benefit now render one permanently inadmissible without hope of
relief, but so do false claims made on employer I-9 forms, when registering to vote, or when
applying for public benefits or financial aid for higher education. (Oddly enough, the
Department of Motor Vehicles in most states routinely completes a voter’s registration card for
applicants for license renewal. Applicants are simultaneously advised to sign at the “X” on the
application for the driver’s license as well as the voter registration with little or no explanation.
Many non-citizens ineligible to vote are therefore unintentionally encouraged to make a false
claim to citizenship by a government official!)
My concern is not that rules and regulations exist or that they are enforced. Nations
must have the authority to create and implement laws. Sovereign states must have some
system for organizing their constituents, for determining as a body what behavior is permissible
and what is not. Limits and consequences for standards chosen by the polity must exist, held in
tension with human rights to self determination. My concern is with convoluted standards that
fail to consider undue consequences for minors. 97
Modern day immigration discourse viewed through the binary lenses of following the
law versus breaking the law or enforcing the law versus ignoring the law leaves little room for
alternative interpretations. The consequences of such discourse for some immigrants can be
devastating. The reality for the “subaltern” (defined by Gayatri Spivak under “Can the
Subaltern Speak?” as “the one who cannot be heard”) is that she is essentialized and her
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experience flattened. 98 She is essentialized in the label of “law breaker” or worse “illegal” or
“criminal” and her public identity is constituted by her offense. (Ironically, even the law itself
does not consider her a criminal as immigration violations are most often civil not criminal
offenses!) Her experience is flattened as it is assumed she is a competent adult intentionally
choosing to flagrantly skirt the law of another nation in order to steal something that is not
rightfully hers. In the immigration context, draconian laws are justified to the extent that they
demand “following the law” often with little understanding of the ways in which such laws are
implemented in real-life cases.
Since 1889, the plenary power doctrine has informed the notion of Congressional
autonomy in writing and implementing immigration policy. The plenary power was
predominantly established through a series of three Supreme Court cases, Chae Chan Ping,
Nishimura Ekiu, and Fong Yue Ting. 99 Though the cases are credited with having given Congress
sole authority over immigration law in the U.S., critics of both the intent in those decisions and
their appropriate applicability abound. Those supporting the plenary power doctrine point to
past holdings and the legal notion of stare decisis which establish the legal practice of
respecting prior precedent as foundational to present decisions and practice. 100 Proponents of
the plenary power are concerned with keeping the governing power of immigration laws within
the hands of elected bodies and thus accountable to the voting public.
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Contrastingly, opponents of the plenary power argue that the lack of checks and
balances upon the public, due process concerns, and other constitutional protections put
immigration law at the whim of Congress leading to a web of laws which are difficult to
interpret consistently and even harder to apply. 101 Some commentators on the plenary power
doctrine hold an extreme position either supporting complete Congressional autonomy over
immigration law and zero constitutional accountability, or a court dominated immigration
system where the judiciary reviews every matter and all administrative decisions (like expedited
removal) are discontinued.
Yet neither extreme seems prudent. There is certainly a measure of well established
stare decisis which supports the governance of immigration law by Congress and the executive
branches. Other scholars have detailed this history exhaustively. 102 Immigration law in the
United States is inherently political in its national security and economic concerns and as such it
is largely appropriate to allow the political branches to write crucial policy.
But as with any governmental entity, appropriate checks must be in place to ensure that
justice is done. The “Carlos case” and “David case” provide clear examples for the application
of the law without the exercise of proper discretionary powers. The Constitution clearly
protects all people physically present in the United States; indeed it is foundational to our
notions of justice and equality. Particularly regarding due process and equal protection, the
Constitution seeks to provide a standard of human rights for our country.
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Conclusion: Policy Proposals
Between judicial control of immigration law and absolute plenary power lies a vast
realm which respects Congressional authority as well as Constitutional constraints. To that end
this paper proposes four recommendations for beginning the process of reform. In the midst of
the controversy of how best to tackle comprehensive immigration reform, it is difficult to not
be for simple, pragmatic changes designed to rectify existing inconsistencies. Particularly as
regards family reunification law, the best interest of the child should be respected as a
significant factor amongst economic and national security interests. Legal precedent for
protecting the best interest of the child has been set in family, welfare, and child labor law.
Critics will argue that immigration law is distinct due to the authority of the plenary power and
a lack of constitutional protections afforded to those without status. Yet studies reveal children
with diverse legal status (citizens, residents, nonimmigrant visa holders, and undocumented)
are significantly affected by immigration law. Mixed status families provide a beginning for
justifying consideration for the best interest of the child.
A thorough Congressional review of family reunification law (as well as a regulatory
review by USCIS) checking for coherency and consistency is a necessary step to ensuring justice
for minors. Specifically, children must not be held responsible for false claims to citizenship and
unlawful presence violations. As nearly two-thirds of U.S. immigration comes through the
avenue of family reunification, such a review would be time well spent to ensure the
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implication of family reunification laws is internally coherent and consistent with political
intent.103
A mechanism must be established to guarantee basic inalienable rights to those present
on U.S. soil including principally the right to due process and equal protection. Congress (and
USCIS as the body largely responsible for implementing Congressional will in immigration) must
be held accountable when writing and implementing our immigration laws to protect a system
of checks and balances as fundamental to our way of governance and a complex appreciation
for the rule of law. 104
Finally, further study regarding the notion of the “rule of law” under immigration law is
necessary to distinguish between fact and rhetorical power. Special attention must be given to
studying primary motivations for undocumented migration and what if any role children play.
Particular focus should be aimed at studying the factors associated with the fear of “rewarding
law breakers.” Evidence for the need for such studies can most recently be seen in the Senate’s
failure in 2011 to move forward on the DREAM Act, a provision which would allow
undocumented children schooled in the U.S. a chance to earn legal residency through good
moral character and college attendance or military service. One of the key reasons it was not
passed is the common perspective that for the law to be respected an “enforcement-only”
stance is required. Senator Jeff Sessions from Alabama summed up this understanding in his
comments to news reporters “If we pass this vote, we signal to the world we are not serious
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about the enforcement of our laws or our borders.” 105 Yet a comprehensive understanding of
the contractual nature of the rule of law recognizes the various forces at work motivating the
violation of immigration laws as well as our government’s own contribution in undermining
respect for the law. If indeed the violation of immigration law can be viewed as breaking a
contract, the government must recognize its responsibility as a party to the contract taking
actions to make the law coherent, consistent, and accessible to citizens and immigrants alike.
Through deepening the consistency of our laws, protecting the interests of children, and
providing for appropriate checks in the governance of immigration, the United States can make
great strides in improving respect for the rule of law as it metes out justice. Reform which
respects a complex understanding of the rule of law will protect not only our nation’s economic
and national security interests, but also the best interests of our children. As we further inform
ourselves of the complex socio-economic factors and gain a deeper understanding of existing
immigration law, perhaps a wise place to look for common ground would be to consider the law
as it affects minors.
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